The Case for a Federal Democratic Republic of Syria-Part I
- Khalil Zahr
- Mar 11, 2019
- 7 min read
middleeastmonitor.com
The Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from Syria has focused the world’s attention on the dynamics of its aftermath, which do not bode well for stability. The risk of conflict has substantially increased in light of the declared intent of various players in northern Syria to extend control over the areas that stand to lose US protection upon withdrawal. These risks have centered discussions on averting military conflict among the various protagonists. The proposals however, by concentrating on the immediate aftermath, fall short of adequately addressing the fundamental issues that need to be dealt with in order to achieve lasting peace and freedom for the Syrian people. Worse still, the tabled proposals concentrate on finding solutions acceptable to the protagonists, with insufficient consideration given to their sustainability or viability.
The Rush to Fill the Vacuum
The US withdrawal would leave the region of north-eastern Syria under the control of the US allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),a Kurdish led alliance of Kurdish and Arab fighters who have been instrumental in liberating large areas of Syria from the control of terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Qaida affiliate). This outcome however, is unacceptable to Turkey, which fears the contagion of autonomy that the Kurds enjoy in Syria and Iraq will spread across the border to infect its sizable Kurdish minority.
Istanbul fears Syria-based Kurdish organizations -such as the US- backed People’s Protection Units (YPG)- may use the Kurdish majority regions that straddle its borders east and west of the Euphrates river as a staging ground for conducting attacks against it. Ankara opposes Kurdish autonomy in Syria and wants to control these areas by constructing security zones along its borders. She is threatening to establish these zones by force if she does not gain the support of the US and Russia.
Both the US and Russia however, oppose potential Turkish incursion into SDF territory. To assuage Ankara’s security concerns, the US accepts the establishment of the security zones, but disagrees with Ankara on how to police them. The US wants a US-led international force to police the zones, not the Turkish military and its Free Syrian Army (FSA) proxies as Turkey demands. Russia, on the other hand, wants these areas to be restored under the Assad regime’s control, with the Syrian army or Russian military policing the zones.
The Assad regime, in turn, is threatening military action to retake the region upon US withdrawal. As an ally of the Syrian regime, Russia agrees with their overall objectives, but believes that they can be achieved through negotiations with the Kurds by enticing them with limited autonomy over their areas. Turkey however, is uncomfortable with the presence of the Syrian army on its borders, especially with the prospect of Assad’s allies, Iran and other Shiite forces moving close to its borders.
The SDF Dilemma
If US withdrawal occurs without reaching an agreement protecting the SDF from threatened onslaughts, whether from Turkey to the North or the Assad regime’s forces to the South, the SDF will likely lose its hard-earned autonomy. Choosing the lesser of two evils, they will likely reach an arrangement with the Assad regime through Russian mediation, with no guarantee that the regime will continue to respect the agreement in the future. Russia, on the other hand, absent Western counterbalance, will be the primary winner. Its influence, prestige, and more importantly, leverage on all the parties involved, will be greatly enhanced.
The Political Process: Dividing the Spoils
The uncertainties surrounding US policy in Syria, coupled with detached European stance brought about by a Syria “fatigue syndrome”, have left the UN peace process under the mercy of Russia, Iran and Turkey. Steffan de Mistura, the UN Syria peace envoy, has failed so far to bring this trio to agree on the makeup of a UN-sponsored Syrian Constitutional Committee, as a first step in creating a viable and comprehensive peace process. This however, should not be surprising, as none of these three autocratic countries have shown any serious interest in a comprehensive solution. Instead, their leaders have been pursuing a different track primarily aimed at avoiding military confrontation while advancing their interests.
Assad, whose interests are well represented by his allies Iran and Russia, will not concede any degree of constitutional reforms that could threaten his regained hold on a large part of Syria. Consequently, failure of the UN led negotiations will be his preferred outcome, and obstruction of the peace process his most likely strategy.
Partial Solutions: Missing the Forest for the Trees
The prospect of a dangerous confrontation in northern Syria is not only shaping the agendas of on-going negotiations among the various competing parties but is also influencing the thinking of well-meaning analysts and experts. Proposals for resolving the conflict have come to prioritise the temporary stabilization of northern Syria at the expense of a comprehensive and permanent solution.
All partial solutions however, are naturally temporary arrangements, and do not effectively address the institutional, political and social issues which are at the root of the Syrian crisis. Furthermore, they tend to empower the Assad regime, whose interest are well-defended at the negotiation tables. In contrast, the SDF, other ethnic and religious minorities of Syria, and the 12 million refugees and displaced Syrians, have hardly any representation. This is attributable to the absence of Western democracies from the negotiating table, as well as the confusion surrounding US foreign policy in general and Syria policy in particular.
Several of the challenges posed by the Syrian crisis cannot be practically met without a comprehensive foundation of constitutional, political, and economic reforms. Such reforms can only be achieved however, by a full commitment to and active participation by Western democracies, particularly the US, in an UN-led peace process.
Assad is a Major Obstacle to a Viable Settlement
An objective assessment of the Syrian crisis leads directly to the uneasy conclusion: reaching a comprehensive and viable solution while Assad is in power is very unlikely. The gains made by the regime in bringing back large areas of the country under his control complicates the proposal of Assad’s removal, and is thought to be a major factor behind the growing apathy towards and disenchantment with Syria. However, bringing long term stability to the country while Assad remains in power is judged infeasible for the following reasons:
As already evident, in order to stabilize areas under his control, the Assad regime’s repression is reaching unprecedented levels. This behavior is expected to worsen due to the depletion of his military and security resources. Continued reliance on foreign allied forces (Iranian backed militias) will likely make matters worse. Moreover, attempting to boost its forces by raising the level of recruitment from minorities may meet resistance from these communities, which will in turn precipitate more repressive measures.
Due to fear of prosecution, the return of refugees and other displaced Syrians (estimated to be around half Syria’s prewar population of 22 million) will be in doubt. International guarantees are meaningless in this circumstance and will not be trusted. As a result, refugees and other displaced Syrians, with fading hopes of return to their homes, will likely fall victims to poverty and despair, creating fertile soil for extremism and instability.
On top of the security and safety issues facing displaced Syrians, any potential return will not be possible without the reconstruction of damaged homes and infrastructure, and the restoration of public services. Such a reconstruction process would require substantial involvement from the international community and is unlikely to be successful under the present regime given the high risks of mismanagement and corruption.
Furthermore, politically motivated assistance, promoted and contemplated by the GCC states, targeted at breaking Assad’s alliance with Iran are at best wishful thinking and an exercise in futility for several obvious reasons. Indeed, the alliance with Iran is vital for the survival of the regime, while the return of refugees and displaced Syrians may not be as important. Furthermore, the support provided by the GCC states to Syrian opposition of all stripes since the early days of the crisis, do not bode well for rebuilding trust and confidence between the two adversaries.
In order for stabilization and reconstruction of Syria to be achieved, it will require a government which in the least can gain the support of the majority of Syrians, and under which ethnic and religious minorities can feel safe and secure. The regime however, has expended all its credits to be able to provide such essential requisites of stability, security, social harmony, and economic growth.
How Strong is the Staying Power of the Assad Regime?
If a comprehensive and viable solution to the Syrian crisis cannot be achieved under the present regime, then how difficult will it be to remove this obstacle? In answering this question, one has to look at the sources from which the regime draws its staying power.
Militarily, the Syrian government’s success in regaining control over large areas of Syria formerly controlled by opposition forces, is due in large part to the effort of allied forces, and not to its own forces who have been weakened by long periods of strife, defection, and attrition. The Iran backed foreign militias have played a decisive role in ground battles, while Russia provided vital air support. The regime’s intrinsic sources of military power are modest at best and insufficient, on their own, to provide for Assad’s defense. Furthermore, their allegiance to the regime is directly proportional to the support of Assad’s popular base; the Alawite community, and other minorities.
The most important source of the regime’s intrinsic power is thought to be the solid support of his base-the Alawite minority, the religious sect to which Bashar el Assad belongs. Added to this is the hesitant support or neutrality of the sizable Christian, Druze, Shia, and other minority communities in Syria. These communities, the Alawites included, have effectively stood by the regime or held neutral, particularly after the rise of the Islamic State (IS). In addition, the regime draws support from a minority of Sunnis with whom Assad shares common interests, in addition to liberal Sunnis who fear the rise of “Takfiri Jihadis”. These communities, faced with difficult choices and absent credible international commitment to defend them against potential genocide, rationally chose the lesser of two evils.
Another important source of Assad regime’s staying power is the notable apathy of the international community, particularly the world’s democracies, towards the Syrian crisis. While solidarity and support by Western democracies had been notable in the early period of the Syrian revolt, it has since faded due to the rising threats posed by international terrorism and the challenges created by the refugee crisis. As a result, the international community, faced by choices similar to those faced by Syrian minorities, made an equivalent choice. Defeating terrorism and stopping the outflow of refugees to Europe became of higher priority than that of assisting the Syrian people in their struggle for freedom.
(To be continued)
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