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How Secularism Better Serves Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Interests

  • Khalil Zahr
  • Mar 8, 2018
  • 7 min read

In most of its dimensions, the undergoing transformation process of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been a near clean break with the past. On the institutional and governance level, the multiple power centers within the royal family and rule by consensus that characterized the former regime, have been changed to a new regime where all powers are effectively centralized (King Salman bin Abdulaziz and his son the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also known as MbS hold all the levers of power). Even the process of succession has been rationalized, where future monarchs will most likely descend from the current King, instead of the wider Al-Saud family.

On the economic level, the actual measures already taken by the Kingdom toward achieving its National Vision 2030 (a strategy for economic and social transformation) with its emphasis on diversification away from oil, reforming prices, lifting subsidies, and fighting corruption, are considered a clear departure from past strategies (past strategies only gave lip service to such objectives).

On the social and cultural level, the change has been nothing but revolutionary. The influence of religious fundamentalists and extremists has been drastically curtailed, and several social liberalization measures have been implemented. Notably, the pivot towards moderate Islam-as declared by MbS - is thought to be the most consequential.

Notwithstanding these notable policy changes on the institutional, economic, social, and cultural levels, some old policies- constructions of a previous era- were either left unchanged or reinforced since the ascendance of King Salman. These policies- if left unchanged- could undermine the whole National Transformation Strategy (NTS) (the NTS is the operational plan for the Vision 2030) and put its outcomes at risk.

If the successful implementation of the NTS is the top priority for the Kingdom at this stage-as one may rationally expect- then all other strategies and endeavors should be subordinated to it and ought to be consistent with and supportive of its goals and objectives. This is especially important considering that this attempt at economic diversification and attaining sustainable economic growth could likely be its last opportunity (due to rising uncertainty in the world oil markets coupled with worsening developmental challenges that face the Kingdom such as chronic high youth unemployment and low levels of economic diversification, among others).

Foremost among those policies that need to be revised is believed to be the Kingdom’s foreign policy, particularly its regional and Islamic dimensions.

The present policy has entangled the Kingdom in costly direct and indirect military confrontations primarily to check Iranian adventurism in the region, or to defend itself against terrorism. Those campaigns however, have been exacting great costs and are demanding in resources that would otherwise be channeled to support the NTS. Worse still, there does not seem to be a near end in sight for these entanglements. On the contrary, its direct campaign in Yemen is more of a quagmire and has been drawing increasing criticism for causing great damage and suffering to Yemenis. Similarly, due to the complexity of the Syrian crisis, its indirect involvement in Syria could extend for a long period without achieving a satisfactory outcome.

It would be useful for Saudi Arabia to look to the experience of other countries who undertook successful economic and social transformations. China comes to mind as a good example to emulate, particularly in the way it prioritized its development by making notable concessions. China had to compromise to reach an accommodation on Hong Kong, or accept the separate status of Taiwan, both of which are still considered by China as integral parts of the mainland. Furthermore, China had to put aside its ideological differences with the Western World, especially the United States, and build a substantial trade and investment network.

Another example would be postwar Vietnam who has-despite a long history of strife and conflict with the U.S and some of its neighbours- subordinated its foreign policy to its development goals by building peaceful relations with all its neighbours and extensive trade and investment channels with its former adversaries.

Similarly, Turkey- before its latest regression to Ottomanization under Mr. Erdogan- had built friendly relations with all regional and world powers while undertaking its economic and social development in the Nineties and the first decade of the 21st Century.

The main issue with the Kingdom’s current inherited foreign policy is that it did not undergo the evolution made necessary by the institutional, economic, and social reforms undertaken by MbS. This policy is the product of a former era, when the Saudi conservative religious establishment had substantial influence on the Kingdom’s political and social discourse. Consequently, its framework and guiding principles are mostly sectarian, where regional issues are looked at predominantly through the lens of Sunni/Shiite, or Sunni / Non-Sunni divide.

This sectarian framework however, is believed to have contributed to the obvious lackluster performance of Saudi policy in advancing its strategic objectives. While domestically, it contributed to the alienation of its Shiite and other non-Sunni citizens and residents.

The sectarian policy has led to putting the Kingdom at odds with whole religious minorities such as the Houthis of Yemen, the Shiite community of Lebanon, and the Shiite majority of neighbouring Bahrain, among others. While in Syria, this policy has led the Kingdom to support certain shady groups in the Syrian opposition who are extremists and takfiris (takfiris consider any one who does not share their beliefs an infidel). More importantly, the sectarian perspective has reduced the effectiveness of its policy towards Iran since-due to its nature- it could not differentiate between the moderates and extremists within Iran. This stance has counter-productively undermined the cause of Iran's moderates and strengthened the grip of the extremists on the country. Iranian hardliners, in turn, (who monopolize Iranian politics and control its foreign and domestic affairs) capitalized on this sectarian stance to create a wedge between Saudi Arabia and non-Sunni Muslim communities within the Kingdom and outside.

The pivot towards "moderate Islam", declared by MbS, needs to be complemented by a liberal secular view of the world built on moderation. Such a strategy should embrace all traditions of Islam with its rich diversity and appeal to moderate secular Muslims. It should also embrace people of all religions, nationalities, and races for it to be credible and sustainable.

In other words, Saudi foreign policy should be founded on liberal secular principles. This will remove the present contradictions between the ongoing process of national transformation with its liberal underpinnings, on the one hand, and a foreign policy weakened and defamed by an illiberal sectarian framework, on the other. It will also enhance the credibility and enforce the sustainability of the pivot toward religious moderation. Attempting to be religiously moderate while holding on to sectarian principles creates an inherent conflict and is untenable in the long run.

On the other hand, a secular policy will be more effective in serving the Kingdom’s strategic interests for various reasons, most important of which are :

  • It will shift the lines of battle- of ideas or otherwise- in regional conflicts away from sectarian confrontations towards more rational contests between moderation and extremism. Moreover, it will contribute to a better understanding of the issues plaguing ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East, such as deficits in human rights, social justice, as well as marked inequality. Such realignment will provide fresh opportunities for newer approaches to conflict resolution that will lead to positive outcomes in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and others. It will also lead to the isolation of extremist and terrorist forces such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and certain Iranian-backed groups. The sectarian divide is a life-line for extremists bolstered by failed economic and social development, high rates of poverty, and huge liberal democratic deficits in the region .

  • It will strengthen national unity, support the integration of various communities within the Kingdom, and enable equitable social and economic development. National unity is bolstered when citizens are treated equally and their concerns about discrimination are alleviated. Furthermore, a secular policy will strengthen the immunity of Saudi society against foreign meddling in its internal affairs. It will also enhance domestic security by bolstering the stake of the sizable expatriate community in the Kingdom’s stability and well-being.

  • It will enhance the position of Saudi Arabia as the custodian of the two Holy Mosques. Saudi Islamic credentials and stature will be enhanced if it embraces all Muslims irrespective of sectarian beliefs or traditions. Furthermore, a secular stance will contribute to the de-politicization of the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimage, improve their safety and security, and enhance religious tourism. It also empowers moderate liberal Muslims internally, regionally, and worldwide, thus weakening extremism and contributing to the defeat of terrorism.

  • It will be more effective in checking Iranian adventurism by undermining the hold of Iranian hardliners who hold monopoly power on the country and are behind its aggressive stance in the region and around the world. The kingdom, by adopting a credible policy that differentiates between the moderate forces (who are the disenfranchised majority of the Iranian People) and the extremists, can help bring about positive change. Unfortunately, the present hard-line policy towards Iran is counterproductive, in the sense that it empowers the hardliners and weakens the forces of moderation who are continuously agitating for change.

There is ample evidence that the reforms undertaken by King Salman and MbS, are already impacting developments inside Iran, and most likely contributed to the street protests that took place in several Iranian cities last month. A December 27 NY Times Article by Nyroya Hakakiana quotes Mariam Memarsadeghi- a cofounder of Tavaana, a website dedicated to civic education in Iran- to have said “When I see reforms in Saudi Arabia, I am doubly elated: happy for Saudi society and women especially, but also thrilled that the Iranian regime’s false moral superiority is punctured…”.The writer goes on to opine: “Iranian activists have always looked to the West to pressure Tehran to respect human rights. But the appearance of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on the scene could shift the attention to Saudi Arabia. Whatever his long-term intentions, he is robbing Tehran of narratives it has long relied on. Citing the Saudis’ poor record in engaging and educating women, Iran has easily deflected Western criticism of its own practices.”

By recasting its policies in a secular framework, Saudi Arabia will substantially improve its chances of a successful national transformation, while leading by example should best serve its strategic interests and enhance its regional and international stature.

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