The Saudi Transformation: Part I - The Case of the Optimist
- Khalil Zahr
- Dec 22, 2017
- 7 min read
King Salman bin Abdulaziz. Image Courtesy of Wikipedia.org
The Saudi Arabian “Blitz” of political, economic, and social transformation, led by King Salman bin Abdulaziz and his son and crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), have drawn few believers and quite many skeptics. This process however, unprecedented in modern Saudi history in its speed and scope, is thought to be rooted in a solid and rational strategy. Furthermore, it has most likely been in the works long before King Salman, its architect, ascended to the throne. The strategy is believed to have three primary goals:
Rationalize the process of succession whose underlying faults have not only been a threat to the Kingdom’s stability, but also a mortal threat to the rule of Al Saud.
Remove the obstacles that have frustrated earlier attempts at institutional and social reforms.
Put the economy on the path of sustainable development through diversification of the economic base away from its heavy dependence on oil.
King Salman & his son Crown Prince Mohammad. www.aleqt.com
The Problem of Succession
Due to its nature, the succession process in Saudi Arabia has always been challenging and fraught with risks of instability. What is surprising, is not its abrupt termination by King Salman, but its endurance for a long 62 year period, since the death in 1953 of the founding father of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al Saud.
King Abdulaziz willed that reign shall pass to his eldest son Saud and to his 35 brothers after him in order of seniority. With no limit set on duration of the reign, it was very unlikely for many of the younger princes to get the chance to rule.
The Saudi Royal Family. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.org
Moreover, if the founder thought that his sons will be accommodating to one another by limiting the duration of their rule, he was evidently wrong. Except for the successor and eldest son Saud who was forced to abdicate, all the other four princes who took the reign prior to the present King Salman, held on to it until their death. This occurred despite, in some cases, extended periods of disablement due to illness.
Consequently, most of the remaining princes have grown old waiting with increasing uncertainty whether their turn to rule will ever arrive. The death of the two most powerful heirs: Sultan (died in 2011), and Nayif (died in 2012), while serving as crown princes to the last King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz (2005-2015) must have reinforced such realization.
Another challenge that faced the succession arose from the fact that, with the first generation of contenders growing too old to rule, it was becoming necessary to widen the selection space to include younger generations. This is especially the case with those heirs who have come of age and are usually better educated, and consequently more suitable, to govern a rapidly modernizing state. There was no clear mechanism however to meet that imperative. The present consultative process proved to be inadequate to the task.
It was thought by some observers that any selection process short of an electoral assembly composed of all eligible princes to elect the future king, would be inadequate. This however was also unrealistic due to the large size (estimated 4000 princes) of the would-be assembly and the large disparities in influence and power among them.
King Abdullah: The Frustrated Reformer
Except for the measures taken by King Salman to concentrate the powers of the state in the hands of his son and crown prince Mohammad bin Salman, the foundations for all other attempted reforms have been built by his immediate predecessor the late King Abdullah.
King Abdullah with President Obama, 2014. Newsbytesapp.com
Grounded in firm secular orientation and liberal outlook, King Abdullah was always thought to be the most likely ruler to modernize Saudi Arabia. This however was not to be, due to strong opposition from several powerful adversaries, most notable of which:
Prince Sultan, the long serving Minister of Defense in control of the army, navy and air force. He accumulated great wealth and influence as a result of unchecked and unlimited military spending.
Prince Nayif, the long serving Minister of Interior in control of security and police forces who also oversaw the Virtue (Religious) Police or (Mutawaa).
The highly influential and wealthy sons of the late King Fahd, (reign 1982-2005).
The influential Wahhabi religious establishment who found allies in any adversary of the King, especially the ultra-conservative Prince Nayif. They were determined to frustrate any reforms that may threaten their influence or loosen their grip on the social and political discourse.
Driven by rapidly rising social and economic pressures and strengthened by large popular support, especially among the young, King Abdullah was able, nevertheless, to initiate several important reforms. Those reforms, though limited in scope due to opposition from powerful adversaries, were very important first steps and symbolically significant:
In a direct challenge to the Wahhabi religious establishment, he built the first coed university in the kingdom, KAUST University.
Built the largest university for women, thus allowing thousands to pursue higher education.
Resumed the education abroad program which has sent thousands of young Saudi women and men to pursue their higher education at foreign universities. This study abroad program was initially launched in the early eighties, but had to be suspended under pressure from the religious establishment who feared that young Saudis sent abroad will be subject to the influence of unwanted secular and liberal thoughts and behaviors.
King Abdullah University for Science & Technology (KAUST)
Launched a comprehensive reform program of the general educational system.
Lead the reform of the legal justice system which until then was dominated and controlled by the religious establishment, as well as established secular commercial courts and arbitration courts.
He also reformed the process of succession by instituting the Council of Allegiance, responsible for selecting future monarchs, by expanding its membership and rationalizing its procedures.
Moreover, in an attempt at centralizing power, he amended the law of succession to allow the sovereign to choose his crown prince. He also created the position of the “Deputy Crown Prince” with the objective of reducing uncertainty in the succession process. (For a good exposition of past reforms see “Remaking of Saudi State”, by Nathan Brown, Carnegie Endowment).
These reforms however, continued to face staunch opposition from the various established power centers. Foot dragging, and obstructions of all kinds slowed the reform process to a crawl, and caused them to fall well short of their desired objectives whether in scope or effectiveness. Naturally, this was a source of great frustration to King Abdullah and to reform-minded Saudis.
The extent of obstruction and constraints faced by King Abdullah while implementing his economic and social policies is illustrated by what a close adviser to the King confided with the author of this blog in 2013. “The King thinks that the national development Plans that the government prepares every five years are not transformative and are mere spending programs for oil revenues. Consequently, he (the King) wished if he can have a secret (for his eyes only) economic and social development program prepared that addresses the real issues that the Kingdom is facing”.
King Salman: The Most Likely Reformer
King Salman must have been aware of his predecessor’s frustrations and had a thorough and unique perspective of the challenges that the reform process had been facing over the past years. The King, despite being younger than his brothers who preceded him to the throne, was the equivalent of a godfather to the Al Saud family. He was considered as the first advisor to his brothers; the peace maker and mediator that made sure that intra-family rivalries and quarrels don’t publicly break out, and remain under control. He was effectively the wise man of the family and the guardian of the monarchy.
Such role had exposed him to the intra-family feuds and rivalries and the serious risks they bring to the monarchy. This experience had most likely reinforced his convictions of the need for reform and the realization that the traditional consensus-centric process of decision making within the Al Saud Family is a major obstacle to any meaningful reform.
Equally valuable and relevant experience that King Salman had, came from his 48 years (1963 – 2011) service as the Governor (Emir) of the important Riyadh Region, in which the capital Riyadh is located. In this capacity, he dealt with the powerful tribes and influential business families of central Saudi Arabia. He was responsible for insuring the continued allegiance to the House of Al Saud of both long-term allies and historical adversaries and must have realized that buying such allegiance was not sustainable.
Moreover, this role brought him closer to those families and their leaders, and allowed him to build networks that would become useful when needed. After all, support of these influential families and tribes would be vital for a successful attempt at power consolidation. Furthermore, this position offered him the optimal vantage point from which to assess the extent of influence that the ultra-conservative Wahhabi movement, whose main power center is central Saudi Arabia, has on ordinary Saudis.
The King also has substantial and diverse experience in world affairs, and has made several official trips abroad. As the Governor of the Riyadh Province, he was often called upon to host world leaders and other dignitaries who visited the Kingdom and to participate in high level discussions. It has been common knowledge that he is well read, and made sure that he is briefed daily on regional and international affairs. This discourse must have strongly influenced his vision of the role that Saudi Arabia ought to play in regional and global arenas. It has also reinforced his belief in the necessity of economic and social reforms that will put the Kingdom on the path to modernity and sustainable development.
Notwithstanding the above factors, the most important attribute that enables King Salman to successfully implement such extensive transformation, is the fact that, unlike his predecessor King Abdullah, he belonged to the Sudairy branch of the Royal Family. He is one of the powerful “Sudairy Seven” brothers, who monopolized the main centers of power, and often checked the powers of the monarch. They had substantial influence on the political, social, and economic discourse of the Kingdom. Any attempt at temporary consolidation and centralization of power in the hands of the monarch, a prerequisite for conducting any meaningful reforms, has a better chance of success if the reformer is a member of this group. An outsider, such as King Abdullah, who was not a Sudairy, would have to face dangerous intra-family alignments that would have increased the likelihood of violent backlash and/or failure.
End of Part I
Comments